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V 
STATEMENT OF LANE KIRKLAND, PRESIDENT 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND 
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
November 8, 1993 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. 
I want to thank you for this opportunity to present the 
position of the AFL-CIO on the issues before this Commission. 
Three questions have been put to the Commission. Those 
questions cannot be answered, however, without a clear 
understanding of what our national labor policy is and what it 
should be for the Twenty First Century. That is therefore where 
I wish to begin. 
The essence of the current national labor policy is to 
assure working men and women full freedom of association and to 
encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining so 
that workers, acting through representatives of their own 
choosing, can jointly determine the terms and conditions of their 
employment. This is, I might add, the policy not only of the 
United States but of every other industrialized country as well. 
Here and abroad that policy takes concrete form in free trade 
unions as the only institutions through which workers have 
sufficient power and independence to deal with their employers on 
an equal footing. 
The collective bargaining system has served this nation, and 
its working people, well. It built the middle class by 
establishing labor standards which are the foundation for the 
world's broadest and most vibrant market economy. All workers — 
union and non-union alike — have been the beneficiaries. 
More recently, the collective bargaining system has proven 
its capacity to respond to the new challenges posed by global 
competition and technological change. In industry after industry 
— including the steel, auto, tire, and telecommunications 
industries to name just a few — working men and women, acting 
through their elected representatives, have in many companies 
joined together with their employers to fundamentally transform 
work, work organization and worker-management relations in ways 
that were unimaginable a generation ago and that advance the 
interests of workers and the firms for which they work. 
Notwithstanding all this, there are those in our society who 
argue that unions and collective bargaining have outlived their 
usefulness and that a "free market" labor policy better serves 
our national interest. They contend that sweatshop conditions 
are now a thing of the past. In our new age of "human resource 
management," they say, employers — guided by the invisible hand 
of the market — can be relied upon to offer their employees fair 
compensation and decent working conditions. 
This argument is not new; in every age opponents of trade 
unionism have claimed that unions were needed only in some prior 
era. As in the past, proponents of this argument misunderstand 
both the realities of the workplace and the operation of markets. 
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For millions of Americans, the work place is still a 
heartless environment. Statistics tell part of the story. There 
are today over 14 million, full-time, year-round workers — one 
fifth of all such workers — whose earnings are below the poverty 
level for a family of four.-7 There are another 10 million 
workers who seek year-round, full-time employment and whose 
earnings are below the poverty level.-7 There are 17 million 
full-time workers who lack health insurance,-7 and 39 million 
full-time workers without pension coverage.-7 And for women and 
persons of color the situation is particularly grim: for example, 
one in four full-time female workers, one in four full-time black 
workers, and one in three full-time Hispanic workers earn below 
the poverty level.^
 v 
It is not just with regard to wages that the market leaves 
many workers unprotected. Each year 2,000,000 "permanent" 
employees are fired and have no recourse.-7 Each year, at least 
-
7
 United States Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics 
Administration, Bureau of the Census, Workers With Low Earnings: 
1964 to 1990 (1992). 
27Id. 
^L. Mishel & J. Bernstein, The State of Working America. 1992-93 
at 402 (1993). 
-' Estimate from Employee Benefits Supplement to the 1988 Current 
Population Survey. 
-
7U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics 
Administration, Bureau of the Census, Workers With Low Earnings: 
1964 to 1990 (1992). 
-^Testimony of Professor Theodore St. Antoine, October 13, 1993, 
Transcript pp. 232-33. 
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60,000 workers die from occupational injuries or diseases, 
another 60,000 workers are permanently disabled, and 6,000,000 
workers are injured in occupational accidents.^ And the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health estimates 
that upwards of 25,000,000 workers are exposed to toxic chemicals 
in their workplaces.^ 
Behind these numbers are our fellow citizens' lives. To 
those who believe that sweatshops are no more, I say: let them 
go to Hamlet, North Carolina and talk to the surviving poultry 
workers; let them go to Carthage, Mississippi and talk to the 
catfish workers; let them go to the fields from coast to coast 
and talk to the migrant farm workers; or let them go to any city 
or town in this country and talk to the janitors, the orderlies, 
the garment workers, and the millions of other workers who still 
face conditions that are unconscionable in human terms. Vast 
number of workers today still need unions for the same elementary 
reason that unions have been needed for generations: to combat 
working conditions that deny workers a decent life and rob them 
of their dignity. 
These working people are the victims of the free market. In 
market terms, workers are merely another factor of production — 
"human capital" they are called. But in a just society, each 
worker is a human being with basic human needs. The market 
-'Bureau of Labor Statistics, Annual Survey of Injuries and 
Illnesses: National Council on Safety, Accident Facts. 
-'NIOSH, National Occupational Exposure Survey 
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cannot be relied upon to meet those needs or protect those 
rights; that is a role of free trade unions. 
Of course, not all working men and women fare poorly in the 
market in strictly economic terms; some do quite well. But all 
workers have needs that the market cannot meet. For the market 
is not an agent for achieving democratic workplaces. 
At its very best, the market produces benign working 
conditions autocratically imposed. But there is a world of 
difference between an industrial dictatorship, however 
benevolent, and an industrial democracy. In a democratic 
society, democratic values cannot end at the plant gate or at the 
office door. Rather, in such a society all citizens are 
entitled, as a matter of right, to participate in decisions which 
critically affect any significant aspect of their lives, not just 
decisions affecting their non-working lives. The market cannot 
secure that right for workers; unions can and do. 
Workplace democracy is not simply a good for working people; 
it is integral to the national interest in a healthy political 
democracy. Workers who participate in decision-making in the 
economic sphere can be counted on to participate actively in the 
political sphere as well; workers who are denied responsibility 
for their workplace conditions cannot. It is thus not surprising 
that vital labor movements nourish political democracy, as the 
recent experience in Central and Eastern Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, Chile and South Africa all attest. And where 
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workplace democracy is extinguished — where workers are left 
unrepresented — political democracy is in jeopardy as well. 
This brings me to a third notion of labor policy that is 
advocated today. There are some who profess to embrace the 
centrality of workplace democracy but claim that "the jury is 
still out" as to its appropriate institutional form. These 
theorists grant that there is still a role for "traditional 
unions" to deal with "traditional management." But just as Marx 
predicted that the state would wither away leaving true 
socialism, this view holds that workplace democracy can be 
achieved without employee organization and with management 
leading the way. 
This too is an old canard masking as a new insight. It was 
advanced by opponents of the Wagner Act in the 1930's who claimed 
that worker representation could be achieved through the American 
Plan of shop committees created and maintained by employers. 
This view was wrong then and it is wrong now. 
By definition, employee participation or empowerment is not 
something that can be done "to" workers; rather, effective worker 
participation requires that workers have a full measure of 
independent power. We know from long experience what management-
created and management-controlled systems of "employee 
participation" are like: they necessarily reinforce existing 
hierarchies and leave management's basic prerogatives unchanged. 
Moreover, such management-led systems inevitably are 
confined within narrow bounds. "Participatory management" — as 
6 
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it is revealingly called — has as its aim the participation of 
front-line employees in improving the quality of the employer's 
product and the efficiency of the employer's operations. Towards 
that end, practitioners of this style of management create 
various committees and teams which are granted varying degrees of 
responsibility. 
But as several of these practitioners have candidly admitted 
to the Commission, they have no interest in allowing their 
employees to participate in determining their terms and 
conditions of employment and they have no use for any independent 
employee voice. These employers remain committed to autocracy, 
however benevolent, and hostile to workplace democracy, however 
productive. Indeed, they resist mightily when democracy — in 
the form of a labor union — rears its head in "their" 
workplaces. 
Participatory management can, of course, produce short-term 
benefits for workers and for firms which previously followed a 
Tayloristic management system. Even as to this, it is noteworthy 
that Jerome Rosow, the President of the independent Work in 
America Institute, testified before this Commission that on a 
pure cost basis "joint programs with the union are about 30% more 
efficient than programs without the union."-7 
Moreover, over the long run, management-created and 
management-controlled systems of employee participation are 
unlikely to elicit a higher level of commitment from, or 
^Transcript of September 15, 1993 at 192. 
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performance by, the workforce. Senator Wagner said it best: 
"cooperation is given only equals."—7 Where that is lacking, 
employee participation programs — from the American Plan of the 
1920's to the quality circle movement of more recent times — 
have proven to be short-lived fads. Indeed, studies have found 
that as many as three-quarters of such programs die within five 
years.W 
Most importantly, whatever the value that employers may 
derive from these new structures they have created and however 
long they may last, there can be no doubt that these systems do 
not satisfy the deeper needs of workers or forward the full range 
of our national interests. Working men and women seek the right 
to.participate in determining not only how their work is done but 
also how the rewards of the work are distributed and in the host 
of other issues that affect their working lives. That is what 
workplace democracy is all about. It is a current and universal 
need of working people. And by definition, employer-created and 
employer-controlled systems of participation cannot provide 
workers with such a right. 
None of this is meant to say, of course, that the collective 
bargaining system is without blemish. Winston Churchill's 
observation about political democracy applies equally to 
•^Address to the New York State Federation of Labor, 1928, quoted 
in Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power. 
Symbol and Workplace Cooperation. 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1993). 
—''Goodman, Realities of Improving the Quality of Work Life. LABOR 
LAW JOURNAL August, 1980, at 487-94. 
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workplace democracy: "No one pretends that democracy is perfect 
or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the 
worst form of Government except for all the other forms that have 
been tried from time to time."—l But given that democracy is, 
in Churchill's terms, the "least worst" form of Government, it 
should remain the aim of our national labor policy. 
In principle, then, we have a sound labor policy for 
achieving the ends of employee participation, private dispute 
resolution and labor-management cooperation — the goals stressed 
in this Commission's charter. That policy is embodied in the 
National Labor Relations Act. Against that background, the 
central task for this Commission is to determine whether the 
labor laws are adequate to effectuate that policy and, if not, to 
V 
recommend changes in those laws. It is to the question of the 
adequacy of the law on the books that I wish to now turn. 
Let me state at the outset that it is not my intent today to 
set forth detailed proposals for amending the labor laws. In 
short order the AFL-CIO will present our specific suggestions to 
you. But the details can be addressed only after it is 
understood how the law, in fact, operates today and how it should 
operate. I therefore wish to discuss this morning three basic 
areas in which, in our view, the law has proved an abject failure 
and to outline the principles that must underlie reform of the 
law. 
& Address to the House of Commons, November 11, 1947, quoted in 
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations at 150 (1979). 
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First, and most fundamentally, the law does not, in 
practice, assure workers full freedom of association. 
Almost sixty years after Congress set about to encourage 
collective bargaining as a means of establishing terms and 
conditions of employment, only about 15% of private sector 
workers are covered by a labor contract. That is a smaller 
percentage of the private sector than was organized in 1935, 
prior to the passage of the Act.—7 
This relatively low level of union membership does not, 
standing alone, necessarily prove a failure of law; the 
memberships level in theory could be — and some argue is — 
explained by a lack of desire for organization on the part of 
workers. But the facts disprove this hypothesis. The experience 
in the public sector makes clear that when workers are given a 
free and uncoerced choice, they continue to opt for union 
representation. 
Thirty years ago, the public sector in the United States was 
the leading edge of what then comprised the "non-union sector." 
Public employees were not covered by the National Labor Relations 
Act, they had no bargaining rights under state law, and the 
public sector was essentially "union-free." 
Over the past three decades, 36 states have enacted laws 
allowing some or all of their public employees to organize and 
bargain collectively. Of the workers covered by those laws, 
6,650,000 now belong to unions and over 7.8 million are covered 
S'cite 
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by collective bargaining agreements. That means that 60% of 
those public employees who have the right to bargaining are 
exercising that right today.—7 
Public employees are not a breed apart from employees who 
work in the private sector. Public and private employees are 
raised together in the same way, go to the same schools, and live 
in the same communities. Public and private employees do the 
same kinds of work: there are publicly-employed janitors, 
drivers, secretaries, nurses and the like just as there are in 
the private sector. The public sector experience thus belies the 
claim that workers today no longer want labor unions and proves 
that the continued existence of a so-called "non-union sector" is 
not an inevitable fact of life. 
The public sector experience also goes far to explain the 
failure of our national labor laws. On paper, the public and 
private sector legal systems are quite similar; indeed most 
public sector labor laws are modeled after the National Labor 
Relations Act. But in practice there is a world of difference 
between the two systems. 
In the public sector, once a state grants its employees the 
right to organize, the state almost invariably respects that 
right and does not seek to prevent its exercise. There are a 
handful of private employers that do likewise — that agree to a 
position of neutrality with respect to whether their employees 
^Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO, Public Employees Bargain 
for Excellence: A Compendium of State Public Sector Labor 
Relations Laws 1993. 
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desire representation. But the norm in the private sector is for 
the employer to exercise its economic power over its employees to 
override the exercise of the organizational right. At the same 
time, public sector workers understand that if they opt to 
organize their employer will honor that choice and will work with 
their representative to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
agreement; in the private sector the opposite is true. 
The private sector employer's campaign to discourage workers 
from organizing often begins even before the employer has workers 
to discourage. It has become quite common for employers to 
select sites for new facilities based at least in part upon the 
perceived propensity of the labor force to join a union. It is 
even more common for an employer to make individual hiring 
decisions on that same basis, after carefully screening a large 
pool of applicants using intrusive psychological testing. And 
upon entering the door as a new employee, workers are handed a 
personnel manual openly declaring the employer's anti-union 
"philosophy." 
All this is merely the prelude to the orchestrated anti-
union campaign which begins when an employer learns that some of 
"his" employees are bold enough to exercise their right of self-
organization. The Wagner Act created a system to resolve what it 
termed "questions of representation" — that is, to ascertain 
employees' desires with respect to representation. But that 
system now operates to prevent such questions from arising and to 
suppress the desire for representation should it surface. 
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What happens during an organizing campaign is, at bottom, 
quite simple: the employer exerts its economic power over its 
employees in order to, in the words of the former union buster 
Martin Levitt, "get hold" of "the collective spirit" and "poison 
it, choke it, bludgeon it ... anything to be sure it would never 
blossom into a united work force.*& By word and by deed, the 
employer sounds a single theme: "I will not tolerate a union at 
'my' workplace and I have the power to defeat it. Those disloyal 
enough to form a union will be punished." This message is 
communicated — and the employer's power asserted — in a myriad 
of ways. 
One element of the anti-union campaign is to isolate and 
ostracize the union and its supporters. The union organizer is 
v. 
excluded from company premises; even property that is open to all 
other members of the public, like a cafeteria or a parking lot, 
are closed to the organizer. Union literature, pins and T-shirts 
are sometimes banned; union talk silenced. Organizing is thus 
turned into a suspect activity that must be conducted only in the 
shadows, and union activists and supporters are made into 
workplace pariahs. 
The second phase of the anti-union campaign involves the 
exercise of supervisory authority to change the tone of the 
workplace or, perhaps, certain parts of the workplace. Managers 
and first-line supervisors are taught that a worker's vote for 
representation is proof of a management failure and will count on 
& M. Levitt, Confessions of a Union Buster at 2 (1993). 
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the supervisor's record as such. Union supporters thus become 
the enemy: they are more closely watched and more frequently 
questioned. What once was condoned, now is condemned; what once 
was friendly now is hostile; what once was relaxed now is tense. 
Only those individuals or groups who renounce the organizing 
effort are spared. 
The third element of the anti-union campaign is the 
propaganda war. Anti-union leaflets are distributed on a regular 
basis; in some campaigns, the employer distributes upwards of 50 
or more separate leaflets, sometimes as often as three times a 
day. Posters are displayed throughout the worksite — huge 
pictures of and blown-up newspaper articles about shut-down 
plants, and signs like "Wear the union label, UNEMPLOYED." One 
company even went so far as to line the entrance to the workplace 
with gravestones each with the name of a unionized company which 
had closed. 
As part of this propaganda campaign, captive audience 
meetings are scheduled, sometimes daily. All workers must attend 
these meetings except for union activists; they are often 
prohibited from attending. These meetings feature speech after 
speech skillfully crafted to take advantage of the employer's 
superior economic position. Overt threats are not necessarily 
part of the script; it is often enough for the employer to 
discuss what "could" happen to the workers' wages and benefits, 
and to their jobs, if they elect to exercise their statutory 
rights. To underscore that this is not just idle speculation, 
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top management of the company is brought in — often from 
corporate headquarters — to deliver these messages. 
To supplement the captive audience meetings, individual 
workers believed to be undecided are called in for one-on-one 
meetings between a supervisor or higher management official. 
These meetings are designed to exploit the individual worker's 
vulnerabilities — identified through a systematic employer 
intelligence gathering operation. 
This entire anti-union campaign, it should be emphasized, 
has nothing to do with a fair debate; indeed, I know of no 
instance in which an employer has ever agreed to debate a union 
representative face-to-face in front of the employees. Nor do 
these anti-union campaigns have anything to do with improving any 
of the ends to which employers profess allegiance such as 
productivity, efficiency, quality or labor-management 
cooperation. To the contrary, during the anti-union campaign all 
these lofty goals are subordinated to the employer's all-
consuming drive to prevent his workers from organizing. 
It is also critical to keep in mind that the careful, well-
counseled employer can do all this more-or-less within the limits 
of the law through veiled threats and acts of discrimination 
which cannot be proven to be unlawfully motivated. Only the 
clumsy employer — or the calculating employer who concludes, 
after examining the Act's meager remedies, that wrongdoing does 
pay — will wage an anti-union campaign in blatant disregard of 
15 
the law with more overt threats and more blatant acts of 
discrimination and retaliation. 
There is a dispute among academics about how often the 
latter type of unlawful campaign occurs. Even the conservatives 
in this debate — the apologists who claim that the Act works for 
employees — acknowledge that in one-third of all representation 
election campaigns, workers are unlawfully discharged.—'' That 
estimate — which, interestingly enough, closely parallels the 
results of a recent study of 261 organizing campaigns—7 — 
reveals that the Act is powerless against endemic employer 
lawlessness. 
But to focus on these illegalities (as measured by the 
number of complaints brought to or the number of remedies 
obtained by the Labor Board) obscures the far more fundamental 
point: with the possible exception of very small businesses, it 
is quite the norm for employers to take it upon themselves to use 
their control of the workplace to make sure their employees do 
not exercise their right of self-organization. Indeed, the study 
of organizing campaigns to which I just referred found intense 
employer opposition 75% of the time. 
—'Lalonde & Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the 
Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 
994 (1991). 
i^Kate Bronfenbrenner, Seeds of Resurgence: Successful Union 
Strategies for Winning Certification Elections and First 
Contracts in the 1980's and Beyond (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Cornell University, 1993). 
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While there is some debate among academics on the exact 
impact of this virulent anti-unionism, workers understand the 
matter perfectly. Workers are not fools. They know who the 
employer is, what his powers are, and what he is saying. They 
know too, who pays their wages; what life would be like working 
in an unremittingly hostile plant or office; and what life would 
be like without a job. Inevitably, when the anti-union campaign 
is over, the workers must take these factors into account in 
deciding whether to exercise their statutory right to organize. 
The impact of the employer's conduct is apparent from the 
data. A recent study of every public sector representation 
election in 1991 and 1992 — 1,911 in all — found that in 85% of 
the elections the workers voted for representation;—'' in the 
private sector the comparable figure is 49%.—' Even more 
telling is the fact that in larger private sector elections, in 
which the anti-union campaign is more elaborate and intense, 
workers vote for representation in only 20% of the elections. 
Indeed, what is truly remarkable is that after all they go 
through, there are still 100,000 private sector workers who each 
year are willing to stick their necks out to form a union. 
If the Commission has any doubt on this score — any doubt 
that the purpose and the effect of anti-union campaigns in to 
157
 K. Bronfenbrenner & T. Juravich, The Current State of 
Organizing in the Public Sector (unpublished, 1993) . 
— ' This figure has been calculated from computer records supplied 
to the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO by the National Labor 
Relations Board. 
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suppress "the collective spirit" — I would urge you to visit 
workplaces in the midst of an organizing effort. See for 
yourselves what is done; hear what is said; experience at first-
hand the raw exercise of economic power. And ask any employer 
with the audacity to claim that these tactics have no effect why 
the employer goes to such great pains, and expends such large 
sums, to mount the anti-union effort. 
The impact of anti-union campaigns is felt even beyond the 
particular workplaces in which they occur; that impact 
reverberates throughout the workforce. Given the intensity of 
employer opposition, workers today cannot organize without their 
own lawyers to fight the legal battles and their own publicists 
to fight the propaganda war. That means organizing becomes 
inordinately expensive — beyond the means of workers at an 
individual workplace and taxing on the resources available to the 
already-organized. The net effect is that in any given year just 
two-tenths of one percent of organized workers have the 
opportunity even to vote as to whether they wish union 
representation. 
In every other context of which I am aware, when the law 
grants workers a statutory right it is understood that workers 
are to be free to exercise the right without interference. It 
would be inconceivable, for example, to allow employers to run 
orchestrated campaigns to stop minority employees from asserting 
their right to equal treatment, or to discourage employees from 
exercising their newly-won right to parental leave. Yet NLRA 
18 
rights are somehow understood to co-exist with an employer 
privilege to stop employees from exercising their rights — a 
privilege broad enough and strong enough to swallow up the rights 
of the employees. Indeed, an entire industry has grown up in 
this country whose sole business is to prevent workers from 
exercising their right to organize. 
The time has come to call anti-unionism what it is: an 
attack on working people and on their freedom. No less than 
racism or sexism, anti-unionism eats at the fabric of our 
national life. 
The time likewise has come to make the law serve its 
purposes — to protect employee freedom of association through 
legal rules and remedies that are up to the task and not just 
through pious declarations that employers can and do ignore. The 
starting point must be that employers have no business meddling 
in the decision by workers as to whether to form a labor 
organization. That is a decision for working people to make for 
themselves, just as the employer has full freedom to decide on 
its representatives. Workers do not need employers to 
participate in the organizational decision; workers are fully 
capable of making that decision themselves, after considering all 
the relevant considerations, without any "help" from the 
employer. 
There is a second, equal basic respect in which our current 
laws are failing to achieve their ends and in which change is 
sorely needed: the rules governing the bargaining process must 
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be reformed so that collective bargaining can once again serve as 
a method through which workers participate on an equal basis in 
formulating the terms and conditions of their employment. 
In an ideal world, perhaps, collective bargaining might 
function as an exercise in disinterested reason leading to a 
perfect understanding. In such a world, the relative power of 
the parties — other than their powers of persuasion would be of 
no moment. But in the real world in which we live "economic 
force" is "a prime motive power for agreements in free collective 
bargaining" as the Supreme Court has stated.—' And in such a 
world, the rules that control the economic weapons available to 
the parties are of the essence in determining the outcome of the 
bargaining process and the opportunity of bargaining to achieve 
real accord. 
As the result of sixty years of judicial interpretation and 
two rounds of Congressional amendments, those rules now so 
aggrandize employer bargaining power and so diminish employee 
power as to undermine the collective bargaining system. 
Employers are left free to do as they will; workers are 
constrained by an increasingly elaborate set of rules. 
The law allows employers what is termed the "free play of 
economic force." If the employer is unable to secure an 
agreement to its satisfaction, the employer can unilaterally 
impose the terms proposed at the bargaining table. 
Alternatively, the employer can lock out his employees and, as 
^Labor Board v. Insurance Agents. 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). 
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the law is currently interpreted, replace the employees until 
such time as they succumb to the employer's demands. Or the 
employer may choose to go through the motions of reaching an 
agreement and then effectively escape the agreement by 
transferring the work covered by the agreement to another 
location, another employer, or even to another legal entity 
created by the employer — euphemistically known as a "double 
breast.• 
Employees, on the other hand, are anything but free to 
exercise their economic force. On paper the law says that 
employees have the right to "engage in concerted activity for ... 
mutual aid or protection." But the Labor Board and the courts 
have held that employees are not protected when they engage in 
partial strikes, in intermittent strikes or in various types of 
"in-plant" activities. 
Employees enjoy even less freedom when they seek to go 
beyond their own workplace and enlist the support of others in 
their cause. In 1947, Congress, over President Truman's veto, 
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act which, among other things, makes it 
illegal for employees engaged in a labor dispute to make common 
cause with workers at other workplaces in mutual defense; such 
appeals for support are now condemned as secondary boycotts. And 
in 1959 Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act which tightened 
Taft-Hartley's provisions and added a new provision which makes 
it unlawful for a union even to negotiate an agreement protecting 
its members from having to handle "hot cargo." 
21 
As a result of these decisions and amendments, essentially 
the only method open to employees to protect themselves is a full 
strike. But under recent decisions, union members who decide to 
strike may not require all members to abide by the group's 
decision, even where each member agreed to such a requirement in 
joining the union. Moreover, under the Supreme Court's Mackay 
Radio decision, an employer may, in effect, dismiss striking 
workers and hire new employees as "permanent" replacements. 
Thus, for un-skilled and semi-skilled workers — and all other 
employed in loose labor markets — the only economic weapon 
available to them is a knife pointed inward. 
The bottom line is this: for those workers most in need of 
the law's protections there is no longer a right to collective 
v. 
bargaining but only a right to collective begging. 
To be sure, many employers — especially those with long-
standing bargaining relationships — have come to realize the 
benefits of dealing with their employees through a representative 
of the employees own choosing. These employers understand 
collective bargaining as an ongoing and flexible process to 
address mutual needs and concerns and these employers willingly 
enter into good faith negotiations in a sincere effort to reach 
an agreement. But even in these situations, the inequality of 
power built into the law looms in the background. In recent 
annual surveys of employers with impending negotiations, the 
Bureau of National Affairs has repeatedly found that upwards of 
80% are committed to, or are contemplating, permanently replacing 
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their workers if the employers are unable to reach an agreement 
to their satisfaction.—' 
Moreover, there are many more employers who want nothing to 
do with the collective bargaining process and who enter 
negotiations seeking discord, not accord. They view the 
bargaining process not as a means of determining what the agreed-
upon terms of employment will be but as a continuation of their 
campaign to prevent their workers from enjoying any agreement or, 
indeed, any representation at all. Their hope is to wear down 
union supporters and undermine union support through a long and 
drawn-out process of so-called "bargaining" or, if necessary, 
provoke a strike and replace the "disloyal" employees with a more 
pliant workforce. 
This approach is particularly prevalent when a union is 
initially organized and seeks to negotiate a first contract. 
Having failed in its effort to thwart the organizing drive, the 
employer typically will delay the start of negotiations by 
contesting the results of the election before the NLRB and the 
courts. When finally compelled to bargain these employers reject 
the possibility of any economic improvements — even improvements 
granted by the employer to workers outside the bargaining unit. 
Proposals for anti-discrimination clauses, occupational safety 
and health clauses, and grievance procedures are likewise 
peremptorily dismissed; what the employers propose instead are 
provisions to preserve all management prerogatives with respect 
^BNA Employee Relations Weekly, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1145. 
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to hiring, firing, transfers, promotions, work assignments, 
training and the like. No room is left for compromise. 
Once again, the numbers tell the story. Over the past two 
decades, seven separate studies have been done of negotiations 
for first labor agreements. Each of those studies has found that 
between 20% and 40% of the time, workers who select a bargaining 
representative are never able to secure a first contract. The 
most recent study, by the AFL-CIO and its Industrial Union 
Department, of all union election victories in 1987, finds that 
in one out of three instances, no agreement was ever reached and 
that in one-fourth of the remaining cases a second agreement was 
not reached. The net effect is that more than half of the time, 
workers who vote for representation have no contract five years 
later. 22/ 
As always, the bare numbers are inadequate to convey the 
meaning of these events. At its hearing in East Lansing, this 
Commission heard from an individual who identified himself only 
as "L.M." because he was afraid that if he gave his full name his 
employer might find out that he had testified and fire him. L.M. 
works in a food processing plant in Detroit where he earns $6.80 
an hour; that, he testified, makes him one of the highest paid 
workers in the plant. He has no health insurance or pension. He 
cannot even afford a phone or a car and walks to work each day. 
22/pavy, Winning NLRB Elections and Establishing Stable Collective 
Bargaining Relationships With Employers (unpublished paper, 
presented to the AFL-CIO/Cornell University Conference on Labor 
Law Reform, October 25, 1993). 
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L.M. and his fellow workers voted for union representation in 
April, 1992; eighteen months later they still have no contract. 
Bargaining has gone nowhere; in typical fashion the employer 
refuses any economic improvements (even though no wage increases 
have been granted since the union was organized) and insists on 
such provisions as advisory arbitration and an absolute right to 
subcontract the employees' work. 
L.M. closed his testimony with these words: 
[M]e and my fellow workers, we need our jobs. We don't want 
to strike, we don't want to walk out. We have to have our 
jobs. ... But as a result the people in the shop, they're 
saying that the union is giving up, the union ain't doing 
nothing for them. And it ain't the union that's given up 
and doing nothing for them it's the system that's not doing 
nothing for them. The system has to come out and do 
something, because we're all stuck. If we can't even get a 
first contract, we're in big trouble, very big trouble. So 
we have to have some outside help somewhere. v 
L.M. could not be more right. Collective bargaining should 
be a right which working men and women enjoy rather than a 
privilege which exists only when, and for so long as, the 
employer chooses to bargain. Legal changes are needed to redress 
the imbalance of bargaining power created by present law. While 
the law may not be able to assure that, in each negotiation, 
labor and management enjoy equal bargaining power, there is no 
excuse for a law which systematically tips the balance of power 
in the employers' favor. And legal changes are also needed to 
prevent employers from using the negotiating process as a means 
of contesting the workers' choice of a representative. 
If the Commission were to address the two broad issues I 
have discussed today — the representation issue and the 
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bargaining issue — your recommendations would go far towards 
enabling the National Labor Relations Act to deliver upon its 
promises to the workers covered by that Act. But there is a 
third fundamental respect in which the law is failing today and a 
third respect in which basic change is needed: in today's 
economy there are millions of workers wholly outside the Act's 
purview. 
Some of those workers — the over 5.5 million employees of 
state and local governments who have no bargaining rights, and 
the over 2 million federal employees who enjoy the most limited 
of rights — fall outside this Commission's jurisdiction. Other 
excluded groups can be dealt with rather easily by a simple 
amendment of the NLRA's definition of "employee" and related 
terms; there is no justification, for example, for excluding 
agricultural workers from the law's protection or for the second-
class status accorded armored truck drivers, building security 
personnel and others similarly situated. 
All of these groups are excluded from the Act's protections 
de jure on the basis of the identity of their employer or the 
nature of their occupation. But there is a large and growing 
group of workers who, de facto have no rights under this Act not 
because of what they do or who they work for but because they 
lack a stable employment relationship which, as a practical 
matter, is indispensable to the exercise of rights under the 
NLRA. I refer, of course, to the "contingent workforce." 
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There are today over 30 million workers in this group, 
constituting between 25% and 30% of working Americans. 
Indicative of this trend is the fact that the single largest 
employer in the United States today is Manpower, Inc. which on 
any given day has upwards of 360,000 workers on its payroll for 
the day. And some projections indicate that by the end of this 
decade the contingent workforce may constitute as much as one 
half of the total labor force. 
Contingent work relationships take numerous forms: 
employment on a day-to-day basis by what are called temporary 
services agencies; direct hiring on a temporary or contract basis 
by an individual employer; casual arrangements whereby the worker 
goes from one employer to another for short, irregular periods of 
time; employee leasing arrangements in which the worker is paid 
by one entity but works for another; permanent part-time 
employment; or self-employment ostensibly as an "independent 
contractor." 
Some of those who make up the contingent workforce are 
highly-skilled professional who work on a free-lance or 
consulting basis. But many of the contingent workers are 
unskilled or semi-skilled workers forced into temporary or 
contract work; even janitors in some places are being labeled as 
"self-employed" entrepreneurs, "contracting" for the franchise to 
clean a particular suite of offices. 
What all these working people have in common is this: they 
do not have the support of even the traditional employment 
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contract and are left untethered and alone. They have no 
benefits, no security, no rights, and they have no legal means to 
organize to advance their interests. They move from job to job 
like the migrant workers who move from farm to farm following the 
harvest. They are what Time magazine calls "disposable 
workers. "22/ 
The contingent workforce falls outside the reach of the 
labor laws. The NLRA was written in 1935 to address the 
prototypical employment relationship that existed at that time: 
long-term employment by a stable employer. The Act therefore 
provides a mechanism for workers at an individual workplace to 
join together to form a representative to deal with their 
employer on an ongoing basis. But that prototype — and hence 
the Act's legal rules — does not fit workers who have no 
particular workplace, no particular employer or who are 
"employed" by an entity which in practical terms has no control 
over employment conditions. 
Thus, entirely new structures and new procedures are needed 
if the contingent workforce is to have democratic rights in 
shaping their working lives. At a minimum, these workers must be 
permitted to organize and bargain above the level of the 
individual workplace or individual firm. And the contingent 
workers likewise must be permitted to deal with the entities 
which as a practical matter control the terms and conditions of 
\ 
227
 Time. March 29, 1993, p. 43. 
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the workers' employment regardless of whether those entities are, 
in fact, technically denominated as the employer. 
The issues I have raised here this morning are not, of 
course, the only issues which the AFL-CIO believes need to be 
addressed by this Commission, nor has my critique of the NLRA 
exhausted our concerns over that law. But in the interest of 
time, I will leave other matters to be raised with the Commission 
through the opportunities for continuing discussion the 
Commission is providing. 
I wish to close with one final point. Our best common 
efforts are needed if this country is to provide working men and 
women an opportunity for stable, productive and rewarding 
employment. Working together, labor and management have much to 
contribute, as the experiences this Commission has examined 
demonstrate. But as Senator Wagner stated sixty-five years ago, 
we can "turn to these newer tasks and to the greater vision" only 
when "organized labor is accepted as an integral and necessary 
part of our social structure and ill-advised efforts to destroy 
it are abandoned and the struggle for mere existence 
terminated."^ 
Peter Pestillo, Executive Vice President of Ford, made the 
same point in his testimony to this Commission: 
If management wants unions to be an ally in the struggle 
with foreign competition, management must accept the 
validity of employee chosen unions as a legitimate 
institution in our society. Management must accept the 
^Address to the New York State Federation of Labor, 1928, quoted 
in Barenberg, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
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union role, must honor it, must value it, must work with it. 
A strong alliance requires two strong members. There should 
be no quibbling about that.2^ 
In that spirit, I wish to conclude by emphasizing that the 
AFL-CIO is willing — and always has been willing — to meet with 
representatives of the employer community concerning the issues I 
have raised today. There is no reason for this country — in 
contrast to virtually every other industrialized country — to 
continue to debate whether freedom of association should be a 
basic right of working people or a mere privileges open to 
nullification by the economically powerful. 
We are under no illusions, and trust the Commission is under 
no illusions, as to the possibilities for such agreement at the 
present time. There is no consensus between labor and 
management on first principles — on the value of workplace 
democracy or on the role of trade unions and collective 
bargaining in democratizing the workplace. The Commission's 
role, if I may is to help forge such a consensus by articulating 
a labor policy for the Twenty First Century and recommending the 
concrete steps needed to effectuate such a policy. 
Thank you very much. 
& July 28, 1993 Transcript at 10. 
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